Resurfacing H1 FY26 results: Swiggy's adjusted EBITDA loss more than doubled to $178m
A resurfacing report shows Swiggy's adjusted EBITDA loss widened 109.1% year-on-year in H1 FY26 as it continued investing in quick commerce. Food delivery GOV grew 18%, while Instamart GOV rose 105%, highlighting the trade-off between rapid expansion and profitability.
The development
Swiggy’s H1 FY26 adjusted EBITDA loss more than doubled as it invested in quick commerce. Food delivery GOV grew 18%, while Instamart GOV more than doubled, underscoring rapid growth despite higher losses.
The numbers
- Adjusted EBITDA loss widened 109.1% year-on-year to $178 million in H1 FY26 ended September 30, versus $85 million a year earlier
- Prosus holds a 25% stake in Swiggy
- Swiggy customer base rose 35% year-on-year to 21.6 million in January-June 2025
- Swiggy GOV grew 43% in January-June 2025
- Food delivery GOV grew 18%
- Instamart GOV grew 105%
- Instamart average order value rose 26% in Q1 FY26
- PayU India revenue reached $397 million
- Prosus India revenue rose to $360 million from $315 million
Why it matters to operators and investors
Instamart’s rapid growth makes Swiggy a stronger strategic quick-commerce platform, though its elevated cash burn may create partnership, consolidation, or capital-raising pressure.
What to watch next
- Instamart contribution margin and adjusted EBITDA trajectory over the next two quarterly results.
- Dark-store count growth versus order density, delivery times, and fulfillment utilization.
- Customer-acquisition cost, discount rate, average order value, and order frequency trends.
- Competitive pricing and expansion actions from Blinkit, Zepto, and other quick-commerce operators.
- Food-delivery profitability growth and its capacity to fund quick-commerce losses.
- Advertising, private-label, and non-grocery mix as indicators of gross-margin expansion.
- Accelerate dark-store additions and assortments in high-density metros while tightening site-level return thresholds.
- Use food-delivery cash generation, Swiggy One memberships, and cross-platform user acquisition to subsidize Instamart customer retention.
- Push higher-margin monetization through sponsored listings, brand-funded campaigns, private labels, and basket-building categories.
- Segment discounts more aggressively by cohort and locality to curb blanket promotions and improve contribution margins.
- Increase scrutiny on capex, cash runway, and quarterly guidance as investors demand evidence that GOV growth converts into improving unit economics.
The counter-case
The headline risks overstating deterioration by treating a deliberate investment cycle as evidence of a broken model. Instamart’s 105% GOV growth may reflect scale-building spend that is temporary and could improve unit economics as order density, assortment utilization and advertising revenue mature. Conversely, the more serious bear case is that this growth is being bought through discounts, dark-store expansion and delivery subsidies: if contribution margins do not improve quickly, larger GOV could simply create larger absolute losses and require repeated capital raises.