Zepto files updated DRHP as India's $83B quick commerce race intensifies against Blinkit, Instamart

Blinkit leads on revenue (Rs 37,779 cr FY26, +625%) and profitability (loss just Rs 277 cr), while Zepto posts highest store productivity but heaviest EBITDA loss at Rs 5,041 cr. Market projected to hit $60-83B by 2030 from $11.3B GMV in 2025.

— FiledWed, 8 Jul, 2026, 11:46 IST·First seen Wed, 8 Jul, 2026, 11:45 IST·Source Financial Express · BrandWagon

What happened

Zepto files updated DRHP ahead of IPO as India's quick commerce race intensifies against Blinkit and Instamart. Blinkit leads on revenue and profitability;

Key facts

  • $11.3B GMV 2025
  • $60-83B by 2030
  • 2,140 orders/day per dark store
  • 2,243 Blinkit stores
  • 1,139 Zepto/Instamart stores
  • 47.97M ATU
  • Rs 1,629 cr investment FY27-30
  • Rs 1,735 cr rental
  • Blinkit Rs 37,779 cr FY26 (+625%)
  • Zepto Rs 22,623 cr (+103%)
  • Instamart Rs 3,859 cr (+81.2%)
  • Zepto EBITDA loss Rs 5,041 cr
  • Instamart loss Rs 3,511 cr
  • Blinkit loss Rs 277 cr
  • ad revenue 7.9%

Why this matters

The intensifying three-way fight in an $83B-bound category and Zepto's cash-hungry model make it a prime candidate for strategic capital, consolidation, or partnership plays as the sector rationalizes toward profitability.

What to watch

  • Zepto DRHP valuation vs implied revenue multiple relative to Blinkit/Eternal
  • Quarter-on-quarter EBITDA loss trajectory for Zepto (narrowing vs widening)
  • Dark-store count and store-throughput/productivity disclosures
  • Ad-revenue and take-rate mix shift in reported financials
  • Any signs of discount war reignition (AOV and contribution margin per order)
  • Regulatory noise on quick-commerce labor, FDI, or predatory pricing
  • Zepto tightens dark-store unit economics and trims low-density micro-warehouses to shrink EBITDA loss before roadshow
  • Blinkit leverages profitability lead to raise take-rates and expand ad/platform monetization
  • Instamart accelerates store rollout to avoid being squeezed into third place
  • New capital raised at IPO redeployed into private-label and advertising margin levers, not just delivery subsidies
  • FMCG brands renegotiate slotting/ad deals as quick-commerce becomes a primary distribution channel